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I confess.
These two words-if the jury hears them-often seal the fate
of a criminal defendant.' As a result, defense lawyers will fight
furiously to suppress a client's confession. A trial court will not
admit a confession into evidence if the defendant did not make it
voluntarily. Even after the trial court has ruled on the
confession's voluntariness, an appellate court can reverse that
ruling.2
In Miller v Fenton, the Supreme Court held that the question
whether a trial court correctly ruled on the confession's
t A.B. 1992, Harvard University; M. Litt. 1994, University of Aberdeen; J.D. Candi-
date 1997, The University of Chicago.
' "[A] full confession in which the defendant discloses the motive for and means of
the crime may tempt the jury to rely upon that evidence alone in reaching its decision."
Arizona v Fulminante, 499 US 279, 296 (1991). See also Bruton v United States:
[T]he defendant's own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evi-
dence that can be admitted against him.... [T]he admissions of a defendant come
from the actor himself, the most knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of infor-
mation about his past conduct. Certainly, confessions have profound impact on the
jury, so much so that we may justifiably doubt its ability to put them out of mind
even if told to do so.
391 US 123, 139-40 (1968) (White dissenting). See also Colorado v Connelly:
Our distrust for reliance on confessions is due, in part, to their decisive impact upon
the adversarial process. Triers of fact accord confessions such heavy weight in their
determinations that "the introduction of a confession makes the other aspects of a
trial in court superfluous, and the real trial, for all practical purposes, occurs when
the confession is obtained.".. . No other class of evidence is so profoundly prejudi-
cial.
479 US 157, 182 (1986) (Brennan dissenting) (citations omitted).
2 Recently, the Supreme Court has scaled back protection for confessing defendants.
Most notably, the Court has held that the improper admission of an involuntary confes-
sion may in some circumstances be harmless error and thus not grounds for reversal. See
Fulminante, 499 US at 310 ("It is evident from a comparison of the constitutional viola-
tions which we have held subject to harmless error, and those which we have held not,
that involuntary statements or confessions belong in the former category.").
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voluntariness (hereinafter "voluntariness determination") re-
quires independent federal determination.3 Most federal appel-
late courts have interpreted this case as requiring de novo review
of the voluntariness determination.4 However, the voluntariness
determination in Miller arose in the context of a habeas corpus
petition.5 The Miller Court did not resolve whether a federal
appellate court must conduct an independent review of such
determinations in cases other than habeas proceedings. As a
result, at least one circuit has declined to review the
voluntariness determination de novo and instead applied the
more deferential standard of "clear error" review on direct ap-
peal.6 The Supreme Court has yet to resolve this confusion
among the circuits.
Deciding the proper standard of review for voluntariness
determinations is important. First, the standard of review affects
an appellate court's willingness to disturb a lower court ruling.
When the standard requires deference (as do "abuse of discretion"
and "clear error," for example), the appellate court often will not
disturb a lower court's finding even if it would not have reached
the same result.' Moreover, the standard of review may influ-
ence the behavior of the trial court. The standard of review sends
a signal to the trial court about the finality of its ruling. A more
deferential standard might promote activism among trial judges
who know that appellate courts will not reverse their rulings.8 In
3 474 US 104, 112 (1985).
See note 44.
Miller, 474 US at 108. Habeas corpus is a postconviction procedure by which a
defendant may collaterally attack his conviction after he has exhausted all other reme-
dies. A writ of habeas corpus "is a judicial order directing a person to have the body of
another brought before a tribunal at a certain time and place." Wayne R. LaFave and
Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 28.1 at 1178 (West 2d ed 1992). Federal courts may
issue this writ when a prisoner is being held in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States. Id at 1177. See, for example, Darden v Wainwright, 477 US 168, 181 (1986)
(writ may issue when prosecutorial misconduct "so infected the trial with unfairness as to
make the resulting conviction a denial of due process").
' United States v Baldwin, 60 F3d 363, 365 (7th Cir 1995). Clear error review is
more deferential than de novo review. Courts reverse under the clear error standard when
they have "a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United
States v United States Gypsum Co., 333 US 364, 395 (1948). See text accompanying notes
57-63.
" See United States v Real Estate Boards, 339 US 485, 495 (1950); Anderson v
Bessemer City, 470 US 564, 573-74 (1985).
' Or, a more deferential standard might encourage restraint among trial judges who
know that appellate courts will be less likely to correct their errors. Which effect would
obtain is an empirical matter beyond the scope of this Comment. In either case, the choice
of standard affects the trial court's behavior.
1312 [63:1311
Voluntariness of Confessions
contrast, less deferential review might promote restraint among
trial judges because appellate courts are more likely to reverse
an erroneous ruling. Finally, standards of review are especially
important in the context of confessions. A confession alone may
provide sufficient evidence to convict a defendant. Therefore, the
choice between the de novo and clear error standards of review
may determine the fate of an entire class of defen-
dants-specifically, those whose confessions are erroneously ad-
mitted at trial but who cannot establish that the trial court's
lapse rises to the level of clear error.
On direct appeal, the standard of review for the
voluntariness determination should be de novo. While Miller did
not conclusively determine the standard of review for this class of
cases, it offered several reasons for adopting the de novo stan-
dard that apply with equal force in cases on direct appeal. Rather
than rely solely on Miller, however, federal appellate courts
should employ other doctrines to support de novo review. For
example, courts should consider treating voluntariness as a type
of "mixed question"-a question involving the application of law
to fact-that should receive de novo review. Alternatively, courts
should expand the constitutional fact doctrine, which permits de
novo review of certain issues involving constitutional rights.
Mixed question analysis and the constitutional fact doctrine alike
yield the de novo result. Either doctrinal solution would be supe-
rior to the current, misplaced reliance on Miller.
Section I of this Comment reviews the Supreme Court's juris-
prudence on confessions, provides a close reading of Miller, and
reviews the division among the federal circuits over the standard
of review for voluntariness determinations on direct appeal. Sec-
tion II analyzes the literature on standards of review and focuses
on two vexing problems in this field-the application of law to
fact (hereinafter "mixed questions") and the constitutional fact
doctrine. These two issues frame the analysis of voluntariness
determinations. Section III analyzes these determinations and
defends the application of de novo review in cases on direct ap-
peal.
I. CONFESSIONS IN THE COURTS
A. Confessions in the Supreme Court
The legal rules governing the admissibility of confessions
have undergone a dramatic transformation from the early com-
mon law. At early common law, confessions were admissible even
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if they had been extracted by inducements, psychological trauma,
or physical torture By the middle of the eighteenth century,
common law courts had begun to exclude confessions from evi-
dence when the defendant had not made them "voluntarily."'0
Following this rule, early American courts asked whether the
interrogation methods were so extreme as to overcome the pre-
sumption that "one who is innocent will not imperil his safe-
ty... by an untrue statement.""
Voluntariness first acquired its constitutional status roughly
one hundred years ago, and the contours of the requirement have
evolved significantly over the last century. The Court first elevat-
ed voluntariness to constitutional status in Bram v United States,
a federal murder prosecution in which the Court held that the
admission of an involuntary confession violated Fifth Amendment
due process. 2 The modern jurisprudence began with Brown v
Mississippi," then unfolded in a series of cases that, like Brown,
originated in state courts and came before the Supreme Court via
habeas corpus petitions or on direct appeal from state supreme
courts.'4 Unlike Bram and other cases that originated in the
federal courts, these cases considered voluntariness through the
lens of Fourteenth Amendment due process. 5 These cases often
involved brutal interrogation techniques, and the voluntariness
determination served as an essential protection for defendants in
state courts. While the origins of the due process rights differ,
' LaFave and Israel, Criminal Procedure § 6.2 at 294 (cited in note 5). The basis for
this rule is unclear. The courts might have admitted the confessions because they did not
recognize voluntariness as a ground for exclusion. Alternatively, courts might have been
concerned about voluntariness yet admitted the confessions because they had a Hobbesian
conception of what was voluntary-at some level, confessions under even the most ex-
treme circumstances involve choice. Whatever the reasoning, though, the result was clear:
admit the confession.
10 Id. See, for example, The King v Warickshall, 168 Eng Rep 234, 235 (KB 1783) ("A
free and voluntary confession is deserving of the highest credit, because it is presumed to
flow from the strongest sense of guilt, and therefore it is admitted as proof of the crime to
which it refers; but a confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the
torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape when it is to be considered as the evi-
dence of guilt, that no credit ought to be given to it; and therefore it is rejected.").
" Hopt v Utah, 110 US 574, 585 (1884).
12 168 US 532, 542 (1897).
13 297 US 278 (1936). In Brown, state police stripped two defendants, whipped them,
and tortured them until they confessed to murder. Id at 282. The Supreme Court held
that the confessions were involuntary and that the convictions denied the defendants
their due process rights. Id at 287.
" See Miller, 474 US at 109-10 (tracing the development of Brown and its progeny);
Frank R. Strong, The Persistent Doctrine of "Constitutional Fact", 46 NC L Rev 223, 249-
61 (1968) (a dated but more thorough discussion of the Court's voluntariness cases).
15 See Miller, 474 US at 109-10, and cases cited therein.
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courts appeal to both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment lines
of cases as authority for their due process analysis of the
voluntariness of a confession.
16
These decisions set the modern procedural and substantive
standards for voluntariness determinations. Until 1966, they
governed all confessions regardless of the setting in which the
confessions were made. Then in the landmark case of Miranda v
Arizona, the Court held that custodial interrogations were inher-
ently coercive and required police to give certain warnings when
placing a defendant in custody.' The classic due process cases,
however, still govern the voluntariness determination in cases
involving noncustodial interrogations. These cases require the
trial judge to hold an evidentiary hearing outside the presence of
the jury in order to determine the confession's admissibility. 8 In
this hearing, the court must decide whether, under the "totality
of the circumstances," the confession was the product of an "over-
borne" will. If it was not, the court may admit the confession
and allow the jury to hear it.
B. Miller v Fenton
In Miller, the New Jersey State Police questioned the defen-
dant, Frank Miller, as a possible murder suspect. After extensive
16 See Joseph D. Grano, Confessions, Truth, and the Law 120-23 (Michigan 1993)
(discussing incorporation).
17 384 US 436, 467 (1966). For a discussion of how post-Miranda courts have nar-
rowed the definition of"custodial interrogation," see George E. Dix, Federal Constitutional
Confession Law: The 1986 and 1987 Supreme Court Terms, 67 Tex L Rev 231, 238-39
(1988).
" The Supreme Court held that due process requires an "in camera" voluntariness
determination in Jackson v Denno, 378 US 368, 389-91 (1964). Jackson overruled Stein v
New York, 346 US 156, 188 (1953), which had allowed the jury to make the initial
voluntariness determination. See generally David M. Nissman, Ed Hagen, and Pierce R.
Brooks, Law of Confessions § 11:1 at 299-301 (Law Co-op 1985) (practitioner's discussion
of the roles of judge and jury in the voluntariness determination).
1" See Culombe v Connecticut:
The ultimate test remains that which has been the only dearly established test in
Anglo-American courts for two hundred years: the test of voluntariness. Is the confes-
sion the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker? If it is,
if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it is not, if his will has
been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of
his confession offends due process.
367 US 568, 602 (1961) (plurality opinion). But see Grano, Confessions, Truth, and the
Law at 61-64 (cited in note 16) (criticizing the "overborne will" doctrine).
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questioning, Miller "fully confessed to the crime."20 At trial,
Miller moved to suppress his confession on the ground that it
was involuntary. The trial court rejected Miller's motion, and the
jury convicted him.21 After the New Jersey Superior Court Ap-
pellate Division reversed the trial court, the New Jersey Supreme
Court reversed the appellate court and held that the confession
was voluntary.
Miller then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
federal district court in New Jersey. The district court dismissed
the application without a hearing. On appeal, the Third Circuit
held that voluntariness is a "factual issue" and limited its review
to "whether the state court applied the proper legal test, and
whether [its] factual conclusions ... [were] supported on the
record as a whole."23 The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of
Miller's application.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Third
Circuit's decision. The Court held that "whether ... the chal-
lenged confession was obtained in a manner compatible with the
requirements of the Constitution is a matter for independent
federal determination,"24 and required the Court of Appeals to
"independently evaluate the admissibility of the confession."25
However, the Supreme Court did not clearly define the scope of
its holding. Some language suggests that the holding governs all
appellate review of voluntariness determinations, while other
language suggests that the holding governs only appellate review
of habeas petitions.25
Several phrases in the Miller opinion suggest that its holding
applies to all appellate review of voluntariness determinations.
First, the Court observed that voluntariness has a "uniquely legal
dimension," because a coerced confession would deprive the de-
fendant of due process.27 Thus, it stated, independent federal
2 Miller, 474 US at 107.
21 Id at 108.
New Jersey v Miller, 76 NJ 392, 388 A2d 218, 226 (1978).
Miller v Fenton, 741 F2d 1456, 1462 (3d Cir 1984), rev'd, 474 US 104 (1985). The
federal habeas corpus statute provides that certain state court findings of fact "shall be
presumed to be correct." 28 USC § 2254(d) (1994). Doctrinally, the Third Circuit was
holding that voluntariness was a finding of fact within the meaning of § 2254(d).
24 Miller, 474 US at 112.
Id at 118.
26 Miller did not divide its analysis along these lines. Instead, the Miller Court first
considered, but did not resolve, whether voluntariness was a mixed question of law and
fact. Id at 112-16. Second, the Miller Court analyzed the "practical considerations" about
voluntariness that supported independent review. Id at 116-18.
22 Id at 116.
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review "play[s] an important parallel role in protecting the rights
at stake."" Second, "assessments of credibility and demeanor
are not crucial to the proper resolution of the ultimate issue of
'voluntariness."'29 Third, confessions "almost invariably occur in
a secret and inherently more coercive environment."3 0 The un-
regulated environment increases the possibility that a defendant
will be deprived of his rights. Fourth, the Court traditionally has
treated voluntariness "as a legal inquiry requiring plenary feder-
al review."31 Finally, a confession's admissibility depends on the
answer to a "legal question" regarding the compatibility of the
interrogation methods "with a system that presumes inno-
cence."
32
These grounds for the Miller holding suggest several conclu-
sions. First, each supports the application of a more exacting
standard of appellate review. In addition, nothing about this
conclusion-at least as it flows from these premises-is peculiar
to the review of habeas petitions. The due process rights impli-
cated by confessions are no less important on direct appeal than
on review of habeas petitions.3 And if the ultimate issue of
voluntariness does not depend on "assessments of credibility and
demeanor," then an appellate court is situated to make this judg-
ment equally well on direct review and in habeas petitions. Like-
wise, federal investigators are just as capable as state investiga-
tors of conducting a confession in a "secret and inherently more
coercive setting."34 Finally, the relationship between the pre-
23 Id.
' Id at 116-17. But see United States v Baldwin, 60 F3d 363, 365 (7th Cir 1995) (jus-
tifying clear error standard on direct review partly because trial judge "is closer to the
facts" and is also "more practiced than appellate judges in assessing the significance of
facts"). Miller and Baldwin disagree on this point because they offer different conceptions
of the voluntariness determination. See note 117.
30 Miller, 474 US at 117.
3, Id at 115.
3 Id at 116.
' However, in cases in federal court, a due process argument on direct review will be
rooted in the Fifth Amendment, while arguments on habeas petitions will be rooted in the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment applies only to states while the
Fifth Amendment applies to the federal government. See LaFave and Israel, Criminal
Procedure § 6.3 at 299 (cited in note 5).
' The Miller Court largely drew on examples of abuse by state police. However,
federal investigators are equally capable of extracting an involuntary confession in a coer-
cive setting. See, for example, United States v Hull, 441 F2d 308, 312-13 (7th Cir 1971)
(holding a confession involuntary after a suspect with an IQ of 51 was "subjected to a con-
tinuous series of intensive interrogations for nearly twelve hours," denied food, and possi-
bly beaten by federal officials).
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sumption of innocence and the method of obtaining the confession
exists with equal force in federal trials.
If the Supreme Court had grounded its holding in these
reasons only, proponents of the de novo standard on direct appeal
would have a strong case. However, the Miller Court did not
confine its analysis to a general discussion of voluntariness. In-
stead, it offered several additional reasons for applying de novo
review in the case before it that suggest its holding is limited to
habeas petitions.
First, "a half century of unwavering precedent" on habeas
petitions had created a "settled rule" that voluntariness determi-
nations require independent federal review. 5 Second, the Court
looked to the legislative history of the federal habeas corpus
statute. 6 While the statute requires a federal court to defer to
the state courts on certain types of findings, the Court found that
the legislative history "undermine[d]" the claim that the
voluntariness determination was a "factual issue" requiring def-
erence.
37
Far from clarifying the holding of the case, this reasoning
only muddled the issues. Unlike the factors that applied general-
ly to confessions in all types of cases, these last reasons have no
analogues in cases on direct appeal. The Supreme Court has not
offered a half century of unwavering precedent on voluntariness
determinations on direct appeal.38 Nor do federal appellate
courts have the benefit of a statute that specifies standards of
review on direct appeal.3 9 Thus, while all of the premises noted
by the Court yielded the same conclusion in the habeas proceed-
ing before it, they point in different directions where the issue
arises on direct appeal. As a result, Miller created more confusion
than it resolved and prompted one federal appellate judge to
conclude that "Miller casts only an oblique ray of light on the
question whether a court of appeals in a federal criminal case
should determine the voluntariness of a confession."
40
' Miller, 474 US at 115.
'7 28 USC §§ 2241-55 (1994).
See Miller, 474 US at 111.
Most of the Court's confession cases have come through state courts via habeas cor-
pus petitions, rather than through direct appeals in federal cases. See Lafave and Israel,
Criminal Procedure § 6.1 at 292-93 (cited in note 5).
' On other occasions, the Supreme Court has avoided the standards-of-review thicket
by resolving a fact/law distinction on statutory grounds. See, for example, Anderson v
Bessemer City, 470 US 564, 566 (1985) (defining intentional discrimination as a finding of
fact by appealing to statutory language in Title VII).
40 United States v Rutledge, 900 F2d 1127, 1129 (7th Cir 1990). Miller has even
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C. Current Approaches
The confusion after Miller has caused federal appellate
courts to adopt different standards of review for voluntariness
determinations on direct appeal.4' Most federal circuits use the
de novo standard-the standard customarily employed by appel-
late courts to review trial courts' conclusions of law.42 Of these
courts, most hold that Miller requires de novo review for cases on
direct appeal, but a few provide reasons for applying de novo
review that are independent of Miller. In contrast, the Seventh
and, possibly, Eleventh Circuits apply the more deferential clear
error standard, traditionally used to review trial courts' findings
of fact.43 These courts reason that Miller does not govern the
standard on direct appeal, and contend that voluntariness, at
least on direct appeal, is more analogous to findings that are re-
viewed for clear error.
1. De novo courts.
The majority of circuits conducts a de novo review of the
voluntariness determination on direct appeal. Most hold that this
is compelled by Miller." These courts still review a lower court's
created some ambiguity in the context of the review of habeas petitions. In Miller, the
federal district court declined to hold an evidentiary hearing. Thus, the Third Circuit was
the first federal court to review fully the petition. In requiring "independent federal
determination" in that case, the Miller Court did not clarify whether such review is
necessary in all cases before the circuits, or rather is necessary only in cases where the
district court has not conducted a hearing. See Keith R. Dolliver, Comment, Voluntariness
of Confessions in Habeas Corpus Proceedings: The Proper Standard for Appellate Review,
57 U Chi L Rev 141, 149-50 (1990) (Miller "based its decision on the need for an 'indepen-
dent federal determination' of issues;" its "emphasis, then, was on establishing that the
federal courts as a body should not defer to state court findings on voluntariness of
confessions.").
41 Readers unfamiliar with standards of review may first wish to consult text accom-
panying notes 57-69.
42 See, for example, Wirtz v Barnes Grocer Co., 398 F2d 718 (8th Cir 1968) (reversing,
under de novo review, a district court's conclusion about the meaning of "enterprise" in
the Fair Labor Standards Act).
' See, for example, St. Bartholomew's Church v City of New York, 914 F2d 348 (2d
Cir 1990) (affirming, under clear error review, a district court's finding that a church had
failed to demonstrate its inability to conduct its religious activities in its existing facili-
ties).
" See, for example, United States v Romero, 897 F2d 47, 52 (2d Cir 1990); United
States v Bethancourt, 65 F3d 1074, 1078 n 1 (3d Cir 1995); United States v Locklear, 829
F2d 1314, 1317 (4th Cir 1987); United States v Robinson, 20 F3d 320, 322 (8th Cir 1994);
United States v Wolf, 813 F2d 970, 974-75 (9th Cir 1987); United States v Chalan, 812
F2d 1302, 1307 (10th Cir 1987); United States v Yunis, 859 F2d 953, 957-58 (DC Cir 1988)
(dictum).
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findings of "subsidiary facts" under the clear error standard.'
For example, these courts will defer to a trial court's determina-
tion about the setting of the confession.' However, when re-
viewing the totality of subsidiary facts, these courts make inde-
pendent determinations about whether the confession was volun-
tary as a matter of law.
Other courts have justified de novo review on grounds inde-
pendent of Miller. For example, in United States v Rigsby, the
Sixth Circuit reviewed de novo a voluntariness determination on
direct appeal.47 In Rigsby, the defendant had confessed to a
crime but alleged that the police had physically coerced him into
giving the confession. Rather than relying on Miller, the court
justified de novo review because police threats of physical vio-
lence would have violated his due process rights.' Under this
reasoning, appellate courts should conduct de novo review when-
ever a case involves the disposition of due process rights.49
2. Clear error courts.
In United States v Baldwin, the Seventh Circuit departed
from the de novo review standard preferred by the other cir-
cuits. 0 After making inculpatory statements to a federal agent,
Baldwin was convicted of drug-related crimes and sentenced to
" See, for example, Locklear, 829 F2d at 1317 ("[T]he findings of the district court as
to the facts surrounding the confession are to be accepted unless clearly erroneous.").
4" See, for example, United States v Rohrbach, 813 F2d 142, 144-45 (8th Cir 1987)
(deferring to district court's findings about the setting of the confession but reviewing
voluntariness "as a matter of law").
47 943 F2d 631, 635 (6th Cir 1991).
48 Id.
"' This reliance on due process suggests that the court may be using the constitution-
al fact doctrine to justify de novo review. See notes 94-111, 137-55 and accompanying text.
o 60 F3d 363, 364-65 (7th Cir 1995). The Eleventh Circuit may have created this
circuit split before Baldwin; however, that circuit has sent conflicting signals regarding its
standard of review for voluntariness determinations on direct appeal. In United States v Mendoza-
Cecelia, for instance, the Eleventh Circuit, citing a pre-Miller decision, held that it "re-
view[ed] determinations regarding the voluntariness of a confession for clear error." 963
F2d 1467, 1475 (11th Cir 1992), citing United States v Vera, 701 F2d 1349, 1364 (11th Cir
1983). Subsequently, though, in Coleman v Singletary, a habeas case, that same circuit
held that it "review[ed] de novo the district court's determination of the voluntariness of a
defendant's confession." 30 F3d 1420, 1426 (11th Cir 1994). These two cases suggest that
the Eleventh Circuit either rejects the binding effect of Miller in cases on direct appeal, or
that the Mendoza-Cecelia court did not consider Miller. While the explanation for the con-
tradictory decisions remains unclear, dictum in a recent Eleventh Circuit opinion suggests
that the latter interpretation may be the correct one. See United States v Barbour, 70 F3d
580, 584 (11th Cir 1995) (voluntariness of confession and waiver of Miranda rights both
reviewed de novo).
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twenty-three years in prison. On appeal, Baldwin alleged that
the agent had coerced his confession by promising to inform the
prosecutor of Baldwin's cooperation if Baldwin assisted with the
investigation. The Seventh Circuit reviewed the voluntariness of
Baldwin's confession for clear error and affirmed the convic-
tion."' In so doing, the Baldwin court explicitly overruled United
States v Hawkins, a 1987 case in which the Seventh Circuit,
citing Miller, had established de novo as the standard of review
for voluntariness determinations on direct appeal.52
The Baldwin court offered several reasons for applying the
more deferential standard of review. First, the court read narrow-
ly the holding of Miller as applying only to review of habeas
corpus petitions and not to federal criminal cases generally."
The court then argued that a district judge is in a superior posi-
tion to make a voluntariness determination because he is "closer
to the facts" and "more practiced than appellate judges in assess-
ing the significance of facts."54 Furthermore, the court stated
that "de novo review is not necessary to produce a reasonable
uniformity of the legal principles applied within the court's juris-
diction."55 Finally, the Baldwin court analogized voluntariness
determinations to other criminal procedure issues that it re-
viewed under the clear error standard and posited that
"[clonsistency and common sense require that the issue of the
voluntariness of a confession be treated the same way.""
" Baldwin, 30 F3d at 366.
52 823 F2d 1020, 1022-23 n 1 (7th Cir 1987), overruled by Baldwin, 60 F3d at 364,
366. Between Hawkins and Baldwin, several judges on the Seventh Circuit had ques-
tioned the binding effect of Miller in cases on direct appeal. See Sotelo v Indiana State
Prison, 850 F2d 1244, 1254 (7th Cir 1988) (Easterbrook concurring) (questioning the ap-
plication of Miller in federal criminal cases); Wilson v O'Leary, 895 F2d 378, 383 (7th Cir
1990) (same); United States v Rutledge, 900 F2d 1127, 1129 (7th Cir 1990) (same); United
States v Wildes, 910 F2d 1484, 1485-86 (7th Cir 1990) (same); Johnson v Trigg, 28 F3d
639, 645 (7th Cir 1994) (questioning whether a federal appellate panel must conduct de
novo review in habeas proceedings where a district judge already has considered the
petition).
' Baldwin, 60 F3d at 364. The Baldwin court suggested that direct review, unlike
habeas review, requires more deference. Justice Jackson, in the context of another case,
reached the opposite conclusion. See Ashcraft v Tennessee, 322 US 143, 158 (1944) (Jack-
son dissenting) (In cases on direct appeal, the Court "should be at liberty to apply rules as
to the admissibility of confessions, based on [its] own conception of permissible procedure,
and in which [it] may embody restrictions even greater than those imposed upon the
States by the Fourteenth Amendment."). The Ashcraft majority did not reach this issue.
" Baldwin, 60 F3d at 365. See note 29 and accompanying text (noting that Miller
rejects this proposition).
Baldwin, 60 F3d at 365.
Id (noting that the existence of probable cause, the validity of waivers of Miranda
rights, and the validity of consent to search are all reviewed for clear error, not de novo).
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II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
In order to decide whether the majority standard of de novo
review is superior to the more deferential clear error standard,
one must understand the rationales for each. This Section ana-
lyzes the literature on standards of review. First, it introduces
the conceptual underpinnings of the distinction between findings
of fact, which are reviewed for clear error, and conclusions of law,
which are reviewed de novo. Second, it explores limitations on
the fact/law distinction by focusing on two vexing problems in the
field, mixed questions and constitutional facts. This analysis
creates a framework for classifying the voluntariness determina-
tion and evaluating the circuits' standards for reviewing this
issue on direct appeal.
A. The Fact/Law Distinction
The classic typology suggests that issues on appeal are either
findings of fact (reviewed for clear error) or conclusions of law
(reviewed de novo). In simple (and simplistic) examples, catego-
rizing a particular issue is an easy task.
Appellate courts review district courts' findings of fact under
the clear error standard. The Supreme Court defined this stan-
dard when it wrote: "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when al-
though there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed."57
A simple example illustrates the application of the clear
error standard to a question of fact. Suppose that P sues D for
negligence arising from an automobile accident."8 P's witness
"' United States v United States Gypsum Co., 333 US 364, 395 (1948). This simple
wording of the standard hides the difficulties in applying it. See Steven Alan Childress,
"Clearly Erroneous": Judicial Review Over District Courts in the Eighth Circuit and
Beyond, 51 Mo L Rev 93, 98 (1986) (noting that the "misunderstanding and misapplica-
tion" of the clearly erroneous standard "has led to constant debate"); John F. Nangle, The
Ever Widening Scope of Fact Review in Federal Appellate Courts-Is the "Clearly Errone-
ous Rule" Being Avoided?, 59 Wash U L Q 409, 416 (1981) (questioning the value of the
Gypsum restatement of the clear error rule). Judge Learned Hand doubted the ability of
courts to unpack the meaning of the clear error standard and concluded that '[i]t is idle to
try to define the meaning of the phrase, 'clearly erroneous.'" United States v Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F2d 416, 433 (2d Cir 1945).
The example of an automobile accident, both in this context and in the subsequent
discussion on conclusions of law, is adapted from Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative
Decision Making Authority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the
Scope of Review, The Judge IJury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 NC L Rev 993,
993-94 n 3 (1986).
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claims that the traffic light was red. D's witness claims that the
traffic light was green. In a bench trial to determine whether D
was negligent,59 the judge will decide whether the light was
green or red. The appellate court will then defer to this determi-
nation unless it is clearly erroneous, as it would be, for example,
if the factfinder determined that the light was red even if no one
testified to that effect and everyone testified to the contrary. In
other words, an appellate court will not "reverse a trial judge's
fact-finding simply because it would have found the facts differ-
ently."
60
This deference reflects several policy concerns. Since the trial
judge is present during testimony, he is better able to observe the
demeanor and determine the credibility of a witness than an
appellate court that is reviewing a cold record.6' In addition,
some trial judges develop a skill at observing witnesses and are
able to "sniff out" those who are lying.62 Finally, deference is
administratively efficient. Because appellate judges, reviewing a
cold record, are unlikely to be able to add much to the trial
judge's findings, deference saves the parties and the courts from
unproductive review of minute findings of fact on appeal.63
' Ordinarily, a jury would make this determination, and its findings would be
subject to even more deferential review than clear error. See Jack H. Friedenthal, Mary
Kay Kane, and Arthur R. Miller, Civil Procedure § 13.4 at 607 (West 2d ed 1993). Confin-
ing the example to a bench trial simplifies the hypothetical by limiting the discussion to
the standards at issue in voluntariness determinations. Since such a ruling at trial is
made outside of the presence of the jury, this simplification is appropriate.
' Ellen E. Sward, Appellate Review of Judicial Fact-Finding, 40 U Kan L Rev 1, 8
(1991). See also Anderson v Bessemer City, 470 US 564, 573 (1985) (Clear error standard
"plainly does not entitle a reviewing court to reverse the finding of the trier of fact simply
because it is convinced that it would have decided the case differently.").
", See Anderson, 470 US at 574 (noting superior position of trial judge to make credi-
bility determinations). See also Evan Tsen Lee, Principled Decision Making and the
Proper Role of Federal Appellate Courts: The Mixed Questions Conflict, 64 S Cal L Rev
235, 260 (1991) (noting the "especially acute knack [of trial judges] for extracting the
subtle inference from otherwise inscrutable declarations and deposition transcripts");
Brent E. Kidwell, Note, A Nation Divided: By What Standard Should Fourth Amendment
Seizure Findings Be Reviewed on Appeal?, 26 Ind L Rev 117, 133 (1992) (noting trial
court's "special expertise... in judging the credibility of the witnesses, analyzing the
demeanor of the parties, and weighing the evidence").
' See Anderson, 470 US at 574 (discussing "experience" and "expertise" of trial judge
in determinations of fact).
' Sward, 40 U Kan L Rev at 24 (cited in note 60) (Appellate review of factfnding
"would be inefficient because it would produce little or no change in the outcome but
would cost the parties and society a large expenditure of legal and judicial resources.");
Kidwell, Note, 26 Ind L Rev at 133 (cited in note 61) ("(J]udicial economy" favors defer-
ential review.). See also Anderson, 470 US at 574-75 ("Duplication of the trial judge's ef-
forts in the court of appeals would very likely contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of
fact determination at a huge cost in diversion of judicial resources" and "is requiring too
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By contrast, appellate courts review district courts' conclu-
sions of law under the de novo standard. De novo review is "[tihe
fullest scope of review."' The appellate court "do[es] not defer to
the lower court's ruling but freely consider[s] the matter anew, as
if no decision had been rendered below."" It involves "an inde-
pendent determination as to the legal conclusions and inferences
which should be drawn from them."66 Suppose, hypothetically,
that the district judge were to conclude that victims of automo-
bile accidents may not sue in negligence. In contrast to the above
example, the appellate court would not defer to this determina-
tion. The appellate court would instead draw its own conclusion
from the record and would, if the jurisdiction's law were other-
wise, reverse that finding.
The lack of deference in de novo review reflects a different
set of policy concerns than review of factual findings. First, by
nature of their institutional role, appellate judges can spend
more time thinking about legal issues. By contrast, trial judges
must spend more time dispensing with procedural motions on
their overburdened dockets.67 Second, de novo appellate review
of legal questions promotes fairness. By creating "uniform legal
principles," " appellate courts strive to ensure that similar cases
result in similar outcomes. Finally, de novo appellate review of
legal issues is efficient. Because appellate decisions are binding
on district courts within the circuit, appellate courts reduce the
need to relitigate the same issues in every trial.69
Courts apply different standards depending on the issue
under review. Trial judges witness the course of a trial and de-
velop an expertise in factfinding. Thus, appellate courts defer to
their findings of fact unless they have committed a clear error.
By contrast, appellate courts are not burdened with time-consum-
much" from the parties.).
' Friedenthal, Kane, and Miller, Civil Procedure § 13.4 at 603 (cited in note 59). See
also Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller, 9A Federal Practice and Procedure § 2588
at 599 (West 2d ed 1995) (discussing de novo standard); James Win. Moore, 5A Moore's
Federal Practice 52.03[2] at 52-77 to 52-81 (Matthew Bender 2d ed 1995) (same).
United States v Silverman, 861 F2d 571, 576 (9th Cir 1988).
United States v Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 US 520, 526 (1961).
One scholar observes that "[aippellate judges ... may be able to devote more time
and energy to analyzing questions of law because that is their primary task." Sward, 40 U
Kan L Rev at 14 (cited in note 60). But Sward goes on to note that this advantage is
-slight." Id.
68 Id.
' Id at 15 (Appellate litigation reduces the "need for repeated litigation in dozens of
trial-level courts."). Of course, good trial lawyers still will seek to distinguish their clients'
cases from unfavorable precedents.
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ing procedural motions and have more time to develop uniform
legal rules for an entire circuit. Thus, they review a trial court's
conclusion of law de novo. These imperfect distinctions presup-
pose that a court can easily classify an issue as a finding of fact
or a conclusion of law. The next Section demonstrates that this
classification is far from clear and explores the limitations on the
fact/law distinction.
B. Limitations on the Fact/Law Distinction
Upon closer inspection, the differences between fact and law
"belie more complex distinctions between the categories."0
Courts and scholars have characterized the distinction between
fact and law as a "formalistic riddle,"' "increasingly hazy,'
2
and as having a "vexing nature."" Others have suggested that
law and fact are not "static, polar opposites" but have a "nodal
quality" and "are points of rest and relative stability on a contin-
uum of experience. ' 4 In some instances, courts confront cases
where the law evolves only through application to the facts. For
example, the law of negligence depends on whether a party's
action was reasonable in a particular set of circumstances. These
mixed questions do not fit neatly into the definition of either fact
or law. Since the standard of review depends on the classifica-
tion, courts struggle to find the proper approach to these ques-
tions.
In other cases, law gives facts their texture and defines their
significance. For instance, where constitutional rights are in-
volved, fact review may implicate important constitutional val-
ues. Under the constitutional fact doctrine, courts sometimes will
review these facts de novo even though strict adherence to the
standards of review might command deference.75
1. Mixed questions.
Once the material facts are known (for example, whether the
light was green or red) and the proper legal rule identified (that
" Louis, 64 NC L Rev at 994 (cited in note 58). In Pullman-Standard v Swint, the
Court confessed that it does not "yet know of any other rule or principle that will unerr-
ingly distinguish a factual finding from a legal conclusion." 456 US 273, 288 (1982).
, Lee, 64 S Cal L Rev at 237 (cited in note 61).
Childress, 51 Mo L Rev at 132 (cited in note 57).
73 Pullman-Standard, 456 US at 288.
" Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum L Rev 229, 233 (1985).
75 See text accompanying notes 94-111.
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negligent drivers must pay), all that remains is for the judge to
apply the law to the facts and announce the result. If only the
process were so easy! Many questions involve elements of both
fact and law. These "intermediate adjudicative determinations"76
are known as mixed questions.
In Pullman-Standard v Swint, the Supreme Court defined
mixed questions of law and fact as:
[Q]uestions in which the historical facts are admitted or
established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is
whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard ... [or]
whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts
is... violated."
Unfortunately, this generalization does not take us very far.
When does this process cross the line between factfinding and
lawmaking? More relevant for the purposes of this Comment, if
this process involves the trial court "making" law, must an appel-
late court review the determination de novo? Scholars note that
"there is no recognized intermediate scope of review"78 for these
questions. 9 Nor is there consistency in the standard of review
for different substantive issues that share the general qualities of
mixed questions.8 " As a result, the uncertainty regarding the
treatment of mixed questions has created a "troublesome and
divisive conflict among the federal circuits."8'
One potential solution to the dilemma of mixed questions is
to develop bright-line rules: X is fact, Y is law. This might simpli-
fy the otherwise tortuous inquiry about how to classify-and,
thus, under what standard to review-an issue. However, when
the Court adopts this method, it often cannot articulate a ratio-
nale for the chosen line.82 As a consequence, this method often
"' Louis, 64 NC L Rev at 1002 (cited in note 58).
77 456 US 273, 289 n 19 (1982).
78 Louis, 64 NC L Rev at 1002 (cited in note 58).
71 The Supreme Court recently passed up the opportunity to provide some much
needed guidance in this area. See Wright v West, 505 US 277, 290 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (declining to decide the standard of review for mixed constitutional questions in
habeas petitions). In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor suggested that the Court's
cases favor de novo review of mixed constitutional questions. See id at 301-03 (O'Connor
concurring).
' Louis, 64 NC L Rev at 1003-05 (cited in note 58) (Definitions of "employee," "scope
of employment," "coercion," and "actual malice" all involve application of law to fact but
are reviewed under different standards.).
" Lee, 64 S Cal L Rev at 235 (cited in note 61). See also id at 238-47 (classifying the
circuits' approaches to the split); Pullman-Standard, 456 US at 289-90 n 19 (describing
the circuit split over how to review mixed questions).
' See Anderson v Bessemer City, 470 US 564, 573 (1985) (asserting that intentional
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leads to inconsistent applications.8 For example, in trying to
craft bright-line rules for defining "facts" in habeas review, the
Court itself has recognized that it "has not charted an entirely
clear course."'
Another potential solution is to create a set of standards that
distinguish findings of fact from issues of law. Such standards
might focus on certain qualities of the determination and the
relative capacities of institutional actors. 5 For example, one
could argue that an issue that turns on a credibility determina-
tion ought to be characterized as a finding of fact, since a trial
judge, unlike an appellate panel, is particularly well situated to
make this determination. By contrast, an issue that turns on the
evaluation of a written record might be characterized as an issue
of law. In this case, the appellate panel and the trial judge are
equally well situated to make a determination. If the determi-
nation creates a legal rule, then the appellate judge should not
be restricted by the trial judge's holding. 6
The second, standards-based approach is the superior meth-
od for determining the standard of review for mixed questions.
This method avoids the logic-chopping of blunt classifications and
reduces the possibility of inconsistent results by providing future
courts with rationales by which to analogize and distinguish
types of findings.
This approach also reflects two important institutional con-
siderations. First, it allocates decision-making authority. Since
the Supreme Court's opinions on standards of review may sup-
port both the clear error and the de novo standards in a particu-
lar case, this approach reflects a determination about "who ought
to have primary responsibility for such decisions."" Since mixed
questions involve at least some legal issues, too much deference
ignores the appellate court's duty "to ensure that justice is
discrimination is a finding of fact without providing an explanation for this assertion).
See Thompson v Keohane, 116 S Ct 457, 464-65 (1995) (explaining different classifi-
cations of mixed questions as either fact or law).
See Miller, 474 US at 113.
See Pierce v Underwood, 487 US 552, 559-60 (1988) (Classification of mixed ques-
tions "has turned on a determination that, as a matter of the sound administration of
justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in ques-
tion."), citing Miller, 474 US at 114.
' In some cases, there may be independent reasons, such as efficiency, for the
appellate judge to defer to the trial judge's determination, even on a matter of law. See
notes 124-36 and accompanying text.
' Lee, 64 S Cal L Rev at 236 (cited in note 61).
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done." ' On the other hand, too little deference would "suck[ ]
[an appellate court] into a whirlpool of unending review of fact
patterns too peculiar to recur."9 Thus, classifying an issue as a
finding of fact would shift decision making to the trial court
while classification as a conclusion of law would shift it to the
reviewing court.9"
Second, this approach has the advantage that different insti-
tutions share the power to choose the standard of review.9' In
some cases, the appellate courts have chosen the standard.92 In
other instances, however, Congress has intervened and expressly
required deferential review. 3 Even if there are doctrinal reasons
for treating these issues as independently reviewable, the con-
gressional determination will prevail.
2. Constitutional facts.
The constitutional fact doctrine requires appellate courts to
review independently certain lower court determinations impli-
cating constitutional rights. Constitutional fact review "reflects a
deeply held conviction that judges-and particularly Members of
[the Supreme] Court-must exercise such [independent] review
in order to preserve the precious liberties established and or-
dained by the Constitution."94 Despite this broad mandate, how-
ever, the Supreme Court appears to have given this doctrine a
narrow scope.9" The Supreme Court most recently invoked
the constitutional fact doctrine in Bose Corp v Consumers Union
" Id.
81 Id.
' See Pullman-Standard, 456 US at 293 (discriminatory intent as a finding of fact
under § 703(h) of Title VII); Anderson, 470 US at 573 (same); Icicle Seafoods Inc. v
Worthington, 475 US 709, 713-14 (1986) (status as "seaman" as a finding of fact under
Fair Labor Standards Act). Sward suggests the concept of "discrimination" exemplifies a
mixed question despite the contrary language in Pullman-Standard. Compare Sward, 40
U Kan L Rev at 32-33 (cited in note 60), with Pullman-Standard, 456 US at 292 n 23.
"' See Pierce, 487 US at 558 (noting that some standards of review are determined by
"statutory command" while others are determined by "a long history of appellate prac-
tice").
' See Louis, 64 NC L Rev at 1027-38 (cited in note 58) (noting the "classification
power" of appellate courts to manipulate standards of review by defining issues as either
fact or law). As an example of this classificatory power, Louis cites the courts' classifica-
tion of the construction of writings as a legal question. Id at 1028.
' For example, § 2254(d) of the federal habeas corpus statute defines certain state
court findings to which a federal court must defer. 28 USC § 2254(d).
' Bose Corp v Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 US 485, 510-11 (1984).
95 This Comment does not consider the use of the doctrine in review of administrative
agency decisions.
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of United States, Inc. 96 In Bose, a manufacturer of music speak-
ers sued a magazine for libel after it published an unfavorable
evaluation of its products. The Court granted certiorari to consid-
er whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) governed the
standard of review for whether the defendant acted with the
"actual malice" necessary in a libel action.97 The Court held that
"[a]ppeflate judges.., must exercise independent judgment and
determine whether the record establishes actual malice with
convincing clarity."98
The reach of the constitutional fact doctrine, as enunciated in
Bose, is unclear. The Bose Court articulated three general princi-
ples to justify de novo review of the "actual malice" determina-
tion. First, "the common-law heritage" of the determination left a
broad role for judicial lawmaking through the application of law
to fact.99 Second, though rooted in the First Amendment, the
rule governing "actual malice" acquired meaning only "through
the evolutionary process of common-law adjudication.""°° Third,
"the constitutional values protected by the actual malice rule"
justified independent review.'
These generalizations might apply to any number of constitu-
tional determinations.' Indeed, Henry Monaghan, in his influ-
ential work on constitutional fact review, noted that "Bose pres-
ents simply one example of constitutional fact review, and the
Court's reasoning is not easily confined to the first amendment
context."0 3 However, post-Bose courts have not used the doc-
trine to decide other issues implicating constitutional rights.'
°4
466 US 485 (1984).
Id at 487-88. FRCP 52(a) provides that "[flindings of fact... shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous." See generally Wright and Miller, 9A Federal Practice § 2585 at
565-78 (cited in note 64).
"' Bose, 486 US at 514.
9 Id at 502.
100 Id.
101 Id. Professor Monaghan argues that this third justification, not the first two, is
"the driving impulse of [the Court's] decision." Monaghan, 85 Colum L Rev at 243 (cited in
note 74).
" See Childress, 51 Mo L Rev at 151 (cited in note 57) (identifying several areas
where the justifications for the Bose constitutional fact doctrine may extend beyond libel
cases). See also Louis, 64 NC L Rev at 1036-37 (cited in note 58) (listing several areas
with "constitutional nexus" not classified as constitutional facts).
103 Monaghan, 85 Colum L Rev at 238 (cited in note 74). See also id at 267 ('That the
Court sees itself under a duty to exercise independent judgment with respect to some, but
not all, constitutional facts suggests that the Court is proceeding on an ad hoc basis, fail-
ing to consider the systemic ramifications of its decisions."); Kidwell, Note, 26 Ind L Rev
at 142 (cited in note 61) ("Broadly read, [Bose] requires de novo review of any action based
upon an interpretation of a constitutional principle.").
"o4 See, for example, Hernandez v New York, 500 US 352, 367 (1991) (plurality opin-
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Even within its present doctrinal limits, the constitutional
fact doctrine, as enunciated in Bose, has come under sharp criti-
cism. Professor Monaghan argues that the Bose Court overstated
the role of appellate courts in the review of constitutional facts
decided by lower courts. While either Article III or the Due Pro-
cess Clause might justify independent judicial review of adminis-
trative adjudication of constitutional facts, these provisions do
not, in Monaghan's view, require independent appellate review of
trial court determinations."5 For appellate review of judicial
determinations, Monaghan argues that independent review "is a
matter for judicial (and legislative) discretion, not a constitution-
al imperative."'
Although he rejects the notion of a judicial duty to review
constitutional facts de novo, Monaghan does admit that appellate
courts should have the discretion to conduct such reviews. In
particular, he encourages courts to exercise heightened review in
two types of cases. First, courts should exercise de novo review in
cases where there is a "need to guard against systemic bias
brought about or threatened by other actors in the judicial sys-
tem." ' 7 Second, the "most important trigger" for de novo review
is the presence of a "perceived need for case-by-case development
of constitutional norms."0 8
Professor Monaghan's standard appears to differ little from
the first two principles announced by the Bose Court: a common-
law heritage and the need for case-by-case rule making. But the
inquiry is subtly different. Monaghan's inquiry looks to the pro-
cess of norm elaboration, while the Bose theory looks to rule
development. To be sure, norms underlie rules, and shifts in
norms will alter legal rules. But, for Monaghan's purposes, one
must look not simply at the process of rule making, but, more
importantly, at the influences behind a court's moral norms.
ion) (holding that "[w]hether a prosecutor intended to discriminate on the basis of race in
challenging potential jurors" is not a constitutional fact). According to Monaghan, the Bose
Court confined the doctrine to First Amendment cases in order to "bypass[ ] the need to
face more systemic considerations." 85 Colum L Rev at 243-44 (cited in note 74). See Hei-
di M. Westby, Comment, Fourth Amendment Seizure: The Proper Standard for Appellate
Review, 18 Wm Mitchell L Rev 829, 839-40 n 76 (1992) (listing cases that read Bose
narrowly).
'"' See Monaghan, 85 Colum L Rev at 262-64 (cited in note 74) (discussing the "legiti-
macy deficit" in administrative proceedings that is not present in lower courts).
' Id at 238.
' Id at 272.
10 Id at 273.
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Monaghan's explication of the proper scope of the constitu-
tional fact doctrine is incomplete. As often happens in the devel-
opment of multifactored tests, Monaghan does not explain wheth-
er a single factor is sufficient to justify de novo review. For exam-
ple, if a case does not involve a systemic bias but does involve a
need for case-by-case development (or vice versa), should the
appellate court review the issue de novo? Furthermore,
Monaghan's theory is too general; it leaves many important ques-
tions unanswered. For example, what types of biases warrant the
application of de novo review? How does a court identify a "per-
ceived need" for case-by-case development of the law? Finally, as
an institutional matter, who should make the determination of
"systemic bias" or "perceived need"? If appellate courts should
make the determination, then this simply slips the substantive
justification for de novo review in through the back door-rather
than justifying review based on the values at stake, appellate
courts will do so by defining certain systemic biases or perceiving
certain needs. Regrettably, such an approach enables a court to
achieve a desirable result without having to consider whether the
values at stake justify the approach.
Despite its shortcomings, Monaghan's explanation highlights
a conceptual similarity between mixed questions and constitu-
tional facts. °9 Both constitutional facts and mixed questions
involve legal principles that only develop through their applica-
tion to particular cases. One might conceive of the presence of
constitutional facts as merely one factor in determining the stan-
dard of review for mixed questions."0 However, the Court's
" The Court in Miller recognized this analytic similarity between mixed questions
and the constitutional fact doctrine. 474 US at 113-14. See George C. Christie, Judicial
Review of Findings of Fact, 87 Nw U L Rev 14, 28-29 (1992) (noting that Professor
Monaghan's analytic framework for constitutional facts "bears some resemblance to the
traditional distinction among questions of law, questions of fact, and mixed questions of
law and fact... [but] also shares many of the unsatisfactory qualities of that traditional
analysis"); Childress, 51 Mo L Rev at 149 (cited in note 57) (describing the constitutional
fact doctrine as an instance in which courts have "refashioned the mixed fact-law analysis
in constitutional terms"); Louis, 64 NC L Rev at 996 n 19 (cited in note 58) (describing the
constitutional fact doctrine as a "model by which appellate courts may remove mixed
questions from the factfinder and review them independently). Justice Rehnquist's dissent
in Bose highlights the overlap between mixed questions and the constitutional fact doc-
trine. The Bose majority explained a number of First Amendment cases in terms of the
constitutional fact doctrine. 466 US at 503-11. Rehnquist, instead, saw these cases as
examples of "the kind of mixed questions of fact and law which call for de novo appellate
review." Bose, 466 US at 517-18 n 1 (Rehnquist dissenting).
110 See Kidwell, Note, 26 Ind L Rev at 144-45 (cited in note 61) (encouraging courts to
employ the doctrine as a factor to determine the standard of review for a particular mixed
question).
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treatment of the doctrine in Bose and in subsequent opinions
citing Bose suggests that the constitutional fact doctrine is an
independent ground for de novo review."'
III. THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR VOLUNTARINESS
DETERMINATIONS ON DIRECT APPEAL
The preceding Section has presented two doctrines that pro-
vide a framework within which to evaluate the proper standard
of review for an issue before an appellate court. In some cases,
the issue is easily classified as a finding of fact or a conclusion of
law, and the standard of review in these cases is well settled.
Voluntariness determinations, however, are not so easily classi-
fied. Although such judgments involve findings of subsidiary facts
and are thus partly fact-driven, they also require a court to draw
legal conclusions from the aggregation of facts and thus involve
conclusions of law. Since some of these legal conclusions impli-
cate the defendant's due process rights, voluntariness determina-
tions may also involve conclusions of constitutional law. Thus,
applying the analytical framework developed above, the standard
of review for voluntariness determinations on appeal from a fed-
eral criminal trial should be de novo.
A. The Voluntariness Determination as a Mixed Question
Under a mixed question analysis, appellate courts should
review voluntariness determinations de novo. Once the trial
judge has established the historical record based on the "totality
of the circumstances," the appellate court is in an equally good
position to evaluate the sufficiency of the record under the legal
standard. In addition, in those cases in which a settled rule's
meaning depends on its application, appellate courts must en-
gage in the sort of factual analysis shunned by the Baldwin
court. Indeed, only by performing such factual analysis can ap-
pellate courts fulfill their lawmaking function.
.. Only the post-Bose treatment of the doctrine has confirmed its use as an indepen-
dent, albeit rarely used, ground. A cryptic footnote in Bose suggested that the doctrine
might simply be a factor in the mixed question analysis. See Bose, 466 US at 500 n 16
("The conclusiveness of a 'finding of fact' depends on the nature of the materials on which
the finding is based.... Particularly is this so where a decision here for review cannot
escape broad social judgments-judgments lying close to opinion regarding the whole
nature of our Government and the duties and immunities of citizenship."), citing
Baumgartner v United States, 322 US 665, 670-71 (1944).
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The choice of de novo review under a mixed question analy-
sis becomes more clear by examining the voluntariness determi-
nation within the Pullman-Standard definition of a mixed ques-
tion." In part, the determination turns on certain historical
facts. The doctrine reflects this by requiring that the court look
at the "totality of the circumstances" to determine
voluntariness.' For example, a court must inquire whether the
defendant was deprived of food or water. Establishing the histori-
cal facts also may require credibility determinations. Thus, if the
defendant claims that the police promised him lenient treatment
and the police deny this, a court must resolve the swearing
match.
Once these pure questions of fact are answered, the
voluntariness determination then involves the second half of the
Pullman-Standard analysis: whether the facts satisfy the legal
standard. The doctrine reflects this by requiring that the court
ask whether the defendant's confession was the product of an
"overborne" will." No amount of metaphysics will enable a
court to discover when a will is overborne. A court can reach this
judgment only by analyzing the established facts and comparing
them to earlier determinations of when a will was overborne.
Thus, framed in terms of the Pullman-Standard analysis,
the voluntariness determination consists of two sequential deter-
minations: the ascertainment of the totality of the circumstances
and the application of the "overborne will" test."' Trial and ap-
pellate courts have different competencies for addressing these
questions. Specifically, trial courts are better able to determine
the "totality of the circumstances," whereas appellate courts are
at least as-if not more-qualified to determine the application of
the "overborne will" rule to those circumstances.
112 See text accompanying note 77. See also Baldwin, 60 F3d at 368 (Rovner dissent-
ing from denial of rehearing en banc) (discussing the "appropriate methodology" of the
voluntariness determination).
1.3 Arizona v Fulminante, 499 US 279, 286 (1991).
11 See Culombe v Connecticut, 367 US 568, 602 (1961) (plurality opinion).
1 Justice Frankfurter, in an opinion that preceded Pullman-Standard, recognized the
multiple stages of the voluntariness determination but divided them into three. First,
trial judges engaged in the finding of "crude historical facts." The second phase involved
the discovery of "psychological" facts (for example, how the defendant reacted in the set-
ting)-a matter for the reviewing court. Third, the reviewing court also applied these facts
to the "standard of judgment." See Culombe, 367 US at 603-05 (plurality opinion). By this
third phase, Justice Frankfurter apparently means the application of law to fact. Inter-
estingly, he stressed that the rule of law, in voluntariness cases, "comprehended both
induction from, and anticipation of, factual circumstances." Id at 603.
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Appellate courts should defer to trial courts' determinations
about the totality of the circumstances. The advantages of trial
court factfinding, identified in Section II, apply with full force to
this part of the voluntariness determination. Trial courts bring
experience and expertise to the evaluations of credibility, de-
meanor, and police conduct that establish the circumstances of
the confession. To this part of the determination, appellate courts
can add little.
However, appellate courts should not defer to trial courts'
applications of the "overborne will" test once the facts have been
established. 6 The trial court is no more qualified than the ap-
pellate court to evaluate how the law applies to that particular
set of circumstances." 7 In fact, as noted in Section II, appellate
courts may be more qualified to apply the law since they are
spared the need to engage in time-consuming factfmding. Fur-
thermore, appellate review helps to ensure uniform results in
like cases. Indeed, Justice Frankfurter suggested that appellate
review of application of law to fact was an essential part of the
lawmaking process for voluntariness determinations."8
The Supreme Court recently offered this conception of the
mixed question analysis in the related context of habeas peti-
11 In Frankfurter's terms, this process of application begins once the external happen-
ings are "uncontested." Culombe, 367 US at 604 (plurality opinion).
117 This bifurcation of the voluntariness determination may explain the disagreement
between Miller and Baldwin. The Court in Miller asserted that the ultimate issue of
voluntariness did not depend on credibility determinations. 474 US at 116-17. The
Baldwin court argued that appellate courts should defer to the trial judge's determination
because he is "closer to the facts." 60 F3d at 365. Both may be correct. The trial court is
closer to the facts, and, on those historical matters, the appellate court should defer. In
this regard, Baldwin is correct. However, the "ultimate issue," using the Miller terminolo-
gy, is the judgment of voluntariness once those facts have been settled. By characterizing
the voluntariness determination as a single judgment, the court in Baldwin sidesteps this
issue.
118 Culombe, 367 US at 578 (plurality opinion) ("That judges who agree on relatively
legal considerations may disagree in their application to the same set of circumstances
does not weaken the validity of those considerations nor minimize their importance."). See
also Davis v North Carolina, 384 US 737, 741-42 (1966) ("It is our duty in this case, how-
ever, as in all of our prior cases dealing with the question whether a confession was
involuntarily given, to examine the entire record and make an independent determination
of the ultimate issue of voluntariness."); Beckwith v United States, 425 US 341, 348 (1976)
(citing Davis and noting that "it is the duty of an appellate court, including [the Supreme
Court]," to make an independent determination of voluntariness). Justice White, joined by
Justice O'Connor, offered a similar conception of the mixed question analysis in another
context. See Pierce v Underwood, 487 US 552, 584 (1988) (White dissenting) ("The histori-
cal facts having been established, the question is to be resolved by the legal analysis of
the relevant statutory and decisional authorities that appellate courts are expected to per-
form.").
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tions. In Thompson v Keohane, the Court considered the standard
of review for determining whether a defendant was "in custo-
dy."" The Court held that the "in custody" determination was
not a § 2254(d) finding of fact and, like the voluntariness deter-
mination in Miller, required "independent federal determina-
tion."' o In the Court's opinion, the "in custody" determination
consisted of "[tiwo discrete inquiries." For the "circumstances
surrounding the interrogation," the reviewing court should defer.
This resembles the "totality of the circumstances" determination
in the voluntariness test. But "[o]nce the scene is set and the
players' lines and actions are reconstructed," the reviewing court
then moves to the second part of the analysis: "an objective test
to resolve 'the ultimate inquiry.' . . . The second inquiry ... calls
for application of the controlling legal standard to the historical
facts. This ultimate determination, we hold, presents a 'mixed
question of law and fact' qualifying for independent review."2
2
Not surprisingly, this second part of the test resembles the ulti-
mate determination about whether a confession was voluntary.
Under the Thompson conception of the mixed question analy-
sis, an appellate court should review the voluntariness determi-
nation de novo. "In custody" proceedings are arguably more fact-
intensive, fact-dependent inquiries than voluntariness determina-
tions.' Thus, if "in custody" determinations are mixed ques-
tions requiring de novo review, then voluntariness determina-
tions must require similar review.
One counterargument to this analysis might be that courts
cannot easily separate factual findings from legal conclusions. An
appellate court, reviewing a cold record, cannot appreciate the
subtle observations that lie behind a trial court's legal conclusion.
Thus, appellate courts should defer to the trial court's ruling on a
mixed question such as voluntariness.
As an empirical matter, this observation may be true, but as
a legal matter, this argument fails. Empirically, courts may be
unable to separate their personal observations from their legal
conclusions. However, the law does not evolve through the per-
,,9 116 S Ct 457, 460 (1995). This issue is important because if a defendant is in custo-
dy, police are required to read him his Miranda rights before interrogating him. Id.
120 Id at 465.
121 Id.
122 Id.
' See LaFave and Israel, Criminal Procedure § 6.6 at 320 (cited in note 5) ("[I]n
custody" inquiry "will often require a careful examination of all the facts and circumstanc-
es of the particular case.").
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sonal observations of trial judges. Rather, trial judges must be
able to explain their legal conclusions through appeal to evidence
apparent on the record. Thus, while the counterargument might
be empirically valid, the legal system treats this method of rea-
soning as irrelevant.
A second counterargument to the mixed question analysis is
that even if the appellate court is in a superior (or at least not
inferior) position to make this second half of the voluntariness
ruling, there may be reasons, independent of its capacity, to sup-
port deferential review. Most notably, some criticize independent
review of mixed questions as an inefficient use of appellate re-
sources.
Appellate courts, the argument begins, operate with scarce
resources. Reviewing mixed questions is an expensive, time-con-
suming, and wasteful process. It requires appellate courts to
delve into trial records and examine closely the factual underpin-
nings of a trial court's judgment. Since two cases rarely, if ever,
involve exactly the same set of facts, this burdensome fact review
does little to further the appellate court's primary goal of crafting
and refining legal rules. Furthermore, expanding the scope of
appellate review encourages parties to appeal, thereby adding
more cases to the appellate docket."
This argument has merit in some cases but is not compelling
in the context of voluntariness determinations. Of course, as a
matter of common sense, delving into a multivolume trial record
is more time-consuming than making a legal determination based
on a brief's factual summary. However, the efficiency argument
is too generalized. Where the legal rule is unsettled, the primary
goal of appellate courts should be to bring coherence to the area.
In these sorts of cases, the mixed question need not be reviewed
de novo; rather, the appellate court should review the trial
court's formulation of the legal rule. If the trial court's formula-
tion is improper, the appellate court can remand without having
to delve into the facts. 5
124 For a general discussion of the efficiency rationale for deferential review, see
Nangle, 59 Wash U L Q at 426-28 (cited in note 57) (arguing that expanding the scope of
appellate review encourages appeals, reduces morale among trial judges, discourages
settlements, and erodes public confidence in the legal system).
" Through the repeated application of law to fact, corollaries to general legal princi-
ples will develop. As these principles develop, appellate courts can review trial records
more efficiently because the corollaries will guide their inquiries. For example, if courts
consistently held a confession involuntary when it involved physical abuse, future courts
could focus their review of the record on whether physical abuse occurred. This reduces
the power of the efficiency argument for deferential review. As one commentator has ob-
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By contrast, when the legal rule is settled (for example, a
confession is involuntary where the defendant's will has been
overborne), the primary goal should not be to clarify doctrine but
to ensure that the doctrine has been properly applied. 6 In
these sorts of cases, appellate courts should review the mixed
question de novo. This type of review may require closer consid-
eration of the facts, but the trial court has simplified this process
by determining the "totality of the circumstances."1 7 Further-
more, the appellate court need only review those portions of the
record that concern the mixed question." s Where the legal rule
is well established, appellate courts can spend more time consid-
ering the facts.
A third counterargument to the idea that the mixed question
analysis compels de novo review was advanced by the Baldwin
court. Since the Seventh Circuit had already reviewed the mixed
questions of consent to search, waiver of Miranda rights, and
probable cause determinations under the clear error standard,
the Baldwin court held that "[clonsistency and common sense
require that the issue of the voluntariness of a confession be
treated the same way.""
The argument from consistency suffers from two fatal flaws
in its logic. Initially, it is not at all apparent that confessions
should be treated in a fashion similar to these other issues.3 '
The dispositive nature of confessions requires a court to approach
the voluntariness determination differently. Although consent to
served: "One would expect that as legal doctrine becomes more uniform and thus more
certain, courts and litigants will expend fewer resources preparing and conducting trials."
Lee, 64 S Cal L Rev at 250 (cited in note 61). However, Lee doubts the strength of this
hypothesis in the absence of "hard empirical data." Id at 251.
' Justice White offered this distinction between mixed questions where the law is
settled and mixed questions where the law is unsettled in another context. Pierce, 487 US
at 585-86 n 2 (White dissenting) (role of appellate court depends on whether law is "quite
clear" or "unsettled").
' On this view, it is essential for district courts to provide clear findings in their de-
cisions. Clearly stated findings help set the stage for appellate review and enable the ap-
pellate courts to determine to which findings they may defer. Thus, clear findings may re-
duce the burden on appellate courts, but, in fairness, probably would require more work
from district courts.
' The Bose Court suggested that the review need not exhaust the entire record. See
Bose, 466 US at 514 n 31 ("[O]nly those portions of the record which relate to the actual-
malice determination must be independently assessed.").
60 F3d at 365.
See Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 Va
L Rev 859, 906-07 (1979) ("[Wjhile we appropriately may borrow voluntariness terminolo-
gy from other legal contexts, uncritical extrapolation of analysis or standards from those
contexts to the law of confessions is unjustifiable.").
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search may be a dispositive issue in possession offenses, 3' it
will not be dispositive in most other crimes. Thus, clear error
operates as a more appropriate baseline standard for consent to
search while de novo is more appropriate for voluntariness.
Even if the issues identified by the Baldwin court involve the
same general inquiry, an appeal to consistency really begs the
question, for it is just as likely that the Seventh Circuit is re-
viewing Miranda waivers, consents to search, and probable cause
under the wrong standard.'32 Consistency, then, would demand
that they be treated like confessions and, following the Seventh
Circuit's pre-Baldwin precedent, be reviewed de novo.
One last counterargument to the notion that the mixed ques-
tion analysis compels de novo review of the voluntariness deter-
mination on direct appeal is that one might distinguish mixed
questions on habeas review from mixed questions on direct re-
view. The Baldwin court narrowed Miller to apply only to habeas
corpus cases.'33 Following the Baldwin court's lead, one could
argue that the Miller Court justified de novo review not because
voluntariness was a mixed question, but because Article III re-
quired a federal court to make an independent determination of
federal rights. If federal adjudication of federal rights is the goal,
however, then an appellate court would not have to review the
voluntariness determination de novo, since an Article III
court-the district court-would have already determined the
federal rights.
This argument provides the most persuasive reason for defer-
ential review of the voluntariness determination on direct appeal,
but it ultimately fails. First, it ignores those portions of Miller
that justified de novo review with reference to the nature of the
determination-not as one involving credibility determinations,
but as a particular form of mixed question that should be re-
viewed de novo.3 4 Second, it fails to account for the exceptional
nature of confessions as potentially dispositive statements given
in oft-coercive settings, a unique characteristic that likewise
justifies de novo review. Finally, the argument disregards the few
131 A suspect's consent to search relieves police of the need to seek a warrant or estab-
lish probable cause. See LaFave and Israel, Criminal Procedure § 3.10 at 233-34 (cited in
note 5).
'" See, for example, United States v Flores, 63 F3d 1342, 1363 (5th Cir 1995)
(voluntariness of Miranda waiver reviewed de novo); United States v Jenkins, 46 F3d 447,
451 (5th Cir 1995) (consent to search reviewed de novo).
3 60 F3d at 364.
34 See Miller, 474 US at 115-17. See also text accompanying notes 27-32.
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federal criminal cases that have come before the Supreme Court
where the Court has, in dictum, approved de novo review of
voluntariness determinations. For example, in Beckwith v United
States, the Court held that IRS investigators were not required to
give Miranda warnings during an interview.35 The Beckwith
Court suggested that if the investigation had been coercive, how-
ever, it would have been "the duty of an appellate court... 'to
examine the entire record and make an independent determina-
tion of the ultimate issue of voluntariness."" 6
A mixed question analysis also supports de novo review of
the voluntariness determination. As Justice Frankfurter identi-
fied over thirty years ago, the determination actually consists of
multiple inquiries. First, a court must determine the underlying
facts; the trial court is in a superior position to make these deter-
minations, and, to these, an appellate court should defer. But a
court must also draw a legal conclusion (the "ultimate determina-
tion"); the appellate court is in as good a position, indeed a supe-
rior one, to make this determination, and, thus, should review a
trial court's determination de novo.
B. Voluntariness as a Constitutional Fact
The constitutional fact analysis presents an even more com-
pelling case for de novo review than the mixed question analysis.
The voluntariness determination fits well within the standards
for constitutional facts announced in Bose, and under the Bose
constitutional fact doctrine, the voluntariness determination
warrants de novo review.
The voluntariness determination arguably satisfies the first
Bose principle-its "common law heritage" has left a broad role
for judicial rule making. This notion may seem inseparable from
the second Bose principle, that the law only acquires meaning
through the common law adjudicative process. But the first prin-
ciple is important and distinct in at least one respect. By using
the term heritage, the Bose Court might have been requiring a
recognition among courts of their special lawmaking role in a
particular area."' If the Bose Court intended this meaning,
which makes its first principle distinct from its second, then the
voluntariness determination clearly satisfies this "heritage" re-
' 425 US 341, 347 (1976).
13 Id at 348, quoting Davis, 384 US at 741-42.
137 See, for example, Medina v California, 505 US 437, 446 (1992) (discussing "com-
mon law heritage" in terms of the historical practice of courts).
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quirement. The Supreme Court consistently has recognized a
special role for reviewing courts in making this determina-
tion.3 ' Indeed, the Miller Court did so by specific analogy to
Bose.'39
The voluntariness determination also satisfies the second
Bose principle, that the rule can only acquire meaning through a
process of common law adjudication. The early twentieth-century
voluntariness cases did not turn on disagreement over abstract
legal principles. Rather, they involved an application of a settled
test to the specific interrogation methods used to extract given
confessions."4 Even where judges dissented from holdings, the
dissents focused not on the correctness of the rule but rather on
how to apply it in the circumstances of the challenged confes-
sions."'
The Court reaffirmed this conception of the voluntariness
inquiry in a recent post-Miller case. In Hernandez v New York,
four members of the Court held that a claim of racial discrim-
ination in the use of peremptory challenges was "a question of
historical fact" not subject to independent review., Yet,he
Hernandez plurality reached this holding by distinguishing Bose
and Miller on the grounds that "actual malice" and
"voluntariness" determinations, unlike peremptory challenges,
"involve legal, as well as factual elements."' In doing so, the
Court confirmed that the law on voluntariness evolves through
its application to particular sets of facts. More importantly, as a
" See Thomas v Arizona, 356 US 390, 393 (1958) (justifying independent review of
voluntariness determination in a habeas case because it "involves the application of con-
stitutional standards of fundamental fairness under the Fourteenth Amendment"); Arizo-
na v Fulminante, 499 US 279, 288-89 (1991) (White dissenting) (citing several cases in
which the Court reversed convictions involving erroneously admitted confessions). The
holding in Fulminante may have eroded this role by allowing appellate courts to affirm
convictions in cases where the confession's admission was harmless error. Id at 310.
"' Miller, 474 US at 114 ("Where, for example, as with proof of actual malice in First
Amendment libel cases, the relevant legal principle can be given meaning only through its
application to the particular circumstances of a case, the Court has been reluctant to give
the trier of fact's conclusions presumptive force and, in doing so, strip a federal appellate
court of its primary function as an expositor of law.").
"' See, for example, Brain, 168 US at 559-61 (analyzing the treatment of "leading and
well-considered cases" in terms of the interrogation methods rather than legal principles);
Chambers v Florida, 309 US 227, 229 (1940) (Voluntariness "necessarily turns" on factual
analysis.); Davis v North Carolina, 384 US 737, 741-52 (1966) (conducting detailed analy-
sis of facts surrounding confession).
141 See, for example, Brain, 168 US at 569-71 (Brewer dissenting).
142 500 US 352, 367 (1991) (plurality opinion).
14 Id.
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doctrinal matter, the Court recognized the analytical similarity
between voluntariness and actual malice.
Finally, courts have placed a high premium on the constitu-
tional values implicated by confessions.1' However, the Court
has offered few clear lines with which to distinguish the impor-
tance of constitutional values. This Comment offers one such line,
based on the dispositive nature of a confession.'" In the ab-
sence of further guidance from the Court, however, courts and
commentators will struggle to identify those constitutional values
that warrant heightened review under the constitutional fact
doctrine.
Unlike the Bose analysis, the constitutional fact analysis
posited by Professor Monaghan does not clearly favor de novo
review. One commentator has argued, in the context of habeas
corpus review, that voluntariness determinations are not consti-
tutional facts.'" However, a close examination of the Court's
jurisprudence on confessions reveals that the constitutional fact
doctrine should not be dismissed so easily in this context.'47
Under a Monaghan-like analysis, the proper standard of
review is unclear. The voluntariness determination on direct
appeal does not satisfy the "systemic bias" standard for
Monaghan's review.'" No evidence suggests a systemic bias
against criminal defendants in the federal courts that would
justify de novo review on direct appeal. By contrast, the Court's
confession cases often found bias in state criminal justice sys-
tems.' If true, this would support de novo review in habeas
" See, for example, Spano v New York, 360 US 315, 316 (1959) ("Because of the
delicate nature of the constitutional determination which we must make [in voluntariness
determinations], we cannot escape the responsibility of making our own examination of
the record.").
..5 See Section 11.C.
' Dolliver, Comment, 57 U Chi L Rev at 153-55 (cited in note 40). But Dolliver does
not cite any support for this assertion.
17 Indeed, the Court in Miller recognized the potential application of the constitution-
al fact doctrine to voluntariness determinations. 474 US at 113-14. However, the Court
declined to resolve the case on that ground. One commentator has attributed this choice
to Justice O'Connor, who wrote for the Miller Court and joined Justice Rehnquist's dissent
in Bose. See Dolliver, Comment, 57 U Chi L Rev at 151 n 39 (cited in note 40). However,
Dolliver misreads the Bose dissent, which did not reject the constitutional fact doctrine.
Instead, the Bose dissent opposed the application of the doctrine in that case, due to "an
appellate court's inability to make... the de novo determination about the state of mind
of a particular author at a particular time." Bose, 466 US at 518-19 (Rehnquist dissent-
ing). Thus, Justice O'Connor's position in Bose does not explain the Miller Court's failure
to decide whether voluntariness was a constitutional fact.
18 See note 107 and accompanying text.
"' See Monaghan, 85 Colum L Rev at 272 (cited in note 74) (state confession cases as
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proceedings but not in direct appeals. 50 Monaghan himself rec-
ognizes that the admission of criminal confessions in state court
proceedings represents a "salient example" of an issue warrant-
ing independent review, especially where such confessions in-
volve racial bias. However, after a lengthy criticism of the
doctrine's application in First Amendment cases, he rejects the
confession precedents as "much weaker." 5'
By contrast, Monaghan's second standard, a perceived need
for case-by-case development of constitutional norms, provides
much more support for de novo review of the voluntariness deter-
mination. The voluntariness determination influences the devel-
opment of due process norms.'52 The doctrine reflects a set of
beliefs about the compatibility of a particular set of police meth-
ods with the Court's conception of due process.'53 This concep-
tion of due process evolves through its application to different
interrogation methods and circumstances surrounding different
confessions. Thus, voluntariness provides a ripe example of the
norm elaboration that justifies de novo constitutional fact review
under Monaghan's theory."M
Under Monaghan's analysis, the proper standard of review
for voluntariness determinations on direct appeal is unclear. This
stems partly from Monaghan's failure to explain the relationship
between his two standards. Analysis under the first standard
does not support de novo review, while analysis under the second
standard strongly supports de novo review. Monaghan does inti-
an example of "systemic bias").
" But see Dolliver, Comment, 57 U Chi L Rev at 155 (cited in note 40) (arguing that,
at best, Monaghan's analysis supports de novo review in federal district courts but not in
federal appellate courts).
... Monaghan, 85 Colum L Rev at 271 (cited in note 74).
152 For a discussion of the constitutional foundations of confession law, see generally
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 Mich L Rev 865 (1981).
" See note 140. See also Louis, 64 NO L Rev at 1035 (cited in note 58) ("Thus, free
review through the doctrine of constitutional fact of questions arising out of police
searches, seizures, and interrogations is designed to deter illegal police conduct."). Schol-
ars continue to disagree over which values drive the voluntariness determination. Com-
pare Yale Kamisar, What is an "Involuntary" Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and
Reid's Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17 Rutgers L Rev 728, 745-46 (1963)
(regulating police interrogations as primary value), and Schulhofer, 79 Mich L Rev at 873
(cited in note 152) (same), with Grano, 65 Va L Rev at 865 (cited in note 130) (reliability
of evidence among primary values). See generally LaFave and Israel, Criminal Procedure
§ 6.2 at 295-96 (cited in note 5) (discussing the policies underlying the voluntariness
doctrine).
" The Sixth Circuit's opinion in Rigsby exemplifies this type of reasoning. Rigsby,
unlike cases in several other circuits, grounded its de novo review not in a broad reading
of Miller but in a concern for the defendant's due process rights. 943 F2d at 635.
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mate, however, that the second standard may be more important
when he characterizes it as the "most important trigger."55 The
analysis, then, tips in favor of de novo review.
C. A Limiting Principle?
Either the mixed question analysis or the constitutional fact
doctrine offers a possible rationale for de novo review of
voluntariness determinations on direct appeal. Several other
issues might also qualify as mixed questions or constitutional
facts, yet the courts have been reluctant to expand these doc-
trines and critics have warned that such expansion would create
a flood of new appeals. Perhaps this reluctance explains, in part,
the appellate courts' misplaced reliance on Miller to justify de
novo review. A principle that limited plenary review to a small
class of cases would allay the concerns of both courts and critics.
The Court has offered some guidance in the search for such a
limiting principle. A confession can be dispositive in a criminal
case, "amount[ing] in effect to a waiver of the right to require the
state at trial to meet its heavy burden of proof."5 ' If a confes-
sion is admitted into evidence, then the protection afforded by
other rights may quickly lose its value. Admittedly, in particular
cases, evidence implicating other areas of criminal procedure,
such as illegal searches in possession offenses, may also be dis-
positive. But, as noted earlier, confessions, unlike consent to
search, can be dispositive regardless of the crime. Thus, an appel-
late court could limit de novo review to cases involving the ad-
missibility of confessions.
A second reason, not explicit in the confession cases, justifies
special treatment of voluntariness determinations. In many cas-
es, constitutional protections regulate the competence of the
evidence admitted in a criminal trial. For example, suppose po-
lice conduct a warrantless search of a defendant's apartment and
find drugs. The defendant will generally seek to suppress the
evidence, but even if the court erroneously admits it, we are not
left with the sense that a grave injustice has been committed.
While the defendant's privacy rights may have been violated, we
have little doubt that the defendant is the individual who com-
mitted the crime. By contrast, in the case of confessions, due
"' Monaghan, 85 Colum L Rev at 273 (cited in note 74).
Colorado v Connelly, 479 US 157, 182 (1986) (Brennan dissenting) (citation omit-
ted).
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process may serve primarily to protect a defendant who had no
connection to a crime. For example, suppose police apprehend a
suspect and extract a confession that the defendant later claims
is involuntary. If we begin to doubt the voluntariness of the con-
fession, not only do we worry that the defendant's rights have
been violated, but we may begin to question whether the defen-
dant had any connection to the crime. Thus, de novo review pro-
vides an added level of protection in cases where we may justifi-
ably doubt whether the proper defendant is on trial.
Appellate courts should limit de novo review to mixed ques-
tions and constitutional facts where the issue is dispositive across
an entire range of crimes. This sort of limiting principle provides
two advantages. First, it provides a clear rule for distinguishing
cases that warrant heightened review from those that do not.
This prevents the characterization games that have created such
confusion in the mixed question cases. Second, it protects an
important category of constitutional rights without opening the
floodgates to constitutional fact review in every criminal proceed-
ing. This should allay the critics' fears of unlimited de novo re-
view.
CONCLUSION
Federal appellate courts should conduct de novo review of
voluntariness determinations on direct appeal. Miller v Fenton
does not necessarily dictate the standard of review for these
cases, and courts applying the clear error standard do not mis-
read Miller. However, by reading away Miller, these courts fail to
recognize that many of its powerful reasons for applying de novo
review in habeas proceedings apply with equal force in cases on
direct appeal.
Two doctrines provide solid and independent justification for
de novo review of the voluntariness determination on direct ap-
peal. First, the voluntariness determination exemplifies a classic
mixed question of fact and law. Second, the voluntariness deter-
mination presents the ripest area for expansion of the constitu-
tional fact doctrine. For both of these reasons, appellate courts
should abandon their exclusive reliance on Miller and instead
employ these doctrines to justify de novo review of the
voluntariness determination in cases on direct appeal. Moreover,
if a court is concerned about wholesale expansion of these doc-
trines, it may limit them to cases involving confessions, which,
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because of their dispositive nature, are particularly deserving of
de novo review.

